POLS 6308 Professor Ernesto Calvo
Why do countries tax their citizens differently? Does partisanship affects the level of public employment? Why do some countries have larger governments? Is centralized wage-bargaining good for growth? Why is the US welfare state comparatively small among its OECD partners? This seminar will provide an introduction to some of the main debates in current political economy, with a particular emphasis on distributive conflicts. The seminar will be comparative in nature, reading intensive, and will require the active participation of the students.
Students will be required to write and present two short discussion papers during the semester. Students are expected do all assigned readings for the week, and actively participate in class discussions. The final grade will be completed with the student’s choice of a final exam or a final paper.
Books to Order
Alesina, Alberto and Howard Rosenthal. 1995. Political Parties, Divided Government, and the Economy. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. ISBN: 0521436206.
Bates, Robert H. 1998.Open-Economy Politics: The Political Economy of the World Coffee Trade. Princeton U.P. ISBN: 0691005192.
Boix, Carles. 1998. Political Parties, Growth and Equality: Conservative and Social Democratic Strategies in the World Economy. New York: Cambridge University. ISBN: 0521585953
Boix, Carles. 2003. Democracy and Redistribution. Cambridge. U.P. ISBN: 0521532671.
Esping-Andersen, Gosta. 1990. The Three Worlds of Welfare Capitalism. Cambridge U.P. ISBN: 0691028575.
Garrett, G. 1997. Partisan Politics in the Global Economy. New York: Cambridge University Press. ISBN: 0521446902.
Gourevitch, Peter. 1986. Politics in Hard Times: Comparative Responses to International Economic Crises. Ithaca: Cornell University Press. ISBN: 0801494362.
Iversen, Torben, Jonas Pontusson, and David Soskice. 1999. Unions, Employers, and Central Banks : Macroeconomic Coordination and Institutional Change in Social Market Economies. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. ISBN: 0521788846.
Przeworski, Adam, Susan C. Stokes and Bernard Manin, eds. 1999. Democracy, Accountability, and Representation. New York: Cambridge University Press. ISBN: 0521646162.
Rogowsky, Ronald. 1990. Commerce and Coalitions. Princeton U.P. ISBN: 0691023301.
Book chapters, Articles, and unpublished manuscripts (Including non-required readings)
Acemoglu, Daron and James Robinson. The Political Origins of Dictatorship and Democracy. Unpublished manuscript.
Acemoglu, Johnson and Robinson. 2001. Reversal of Fortune: Geography and Institutions in the Making of the Modern World Income Distribution. Mimeo.
Alberto Alesina and Jeffrey Sachs. 1988. "Political Parties and the Business Cycle in the United States, 1948-1984," Journal of Money, Credit and Banking, 20, pp. 63-83.
Alesina, Alberto and Nouriel Roubini. Political Cycles and the Macroeconomy. MIT Press. ISBN: 0262510944.
Alessina, Alberto and Dani Rodrik. 1994. Distributive Politics and Economic Growth. Quarterly Journal of Economics. May.
Alessina, Alberto, Stephan Danninger, and Massimo Rostagno.2001. Redistribution Through Public Employment: The Case of Italy. IMF Staff Papers Vol. 48, No. 3.
Baron, David, "Majoritarian Incentives, Pork Barrel Programs, and Procedural Control," AJPS 35, 1991: 57-90.
Boix, Carles and Susan Stokes. Endogenous Democratization. Unpublished manuscript.
Boix, Carles. 2001. “Democracy, Development and the Public Sector.” American Journal of Political Science 45 (January).
Cameron, David R.. 1978. "The Expansion of the Public Economy: A Comparative Analysis," AmericanPolitical Science Review, 72, pp. 1243-1261.
Douglas North. 1981. Structure and Change in Economic History. New York: Norton. Chapters 1, 6, and conclusion.
Downs, Anthony, "Why the Government's Budget is Too Small in a Democracy," World Politics 12 (1960): 541-63.
Epstein, David and Sharyn O’Hallaran. 1996. Divided Government and the Design of Administrative Procedures: A formal Model and Empirical Test. Journal of Politics. 52(2): 373-397.
Frieden, Jeffrey.1994. Exchange Rate Politics: Contemporary Lessons from the American History. Review of International Political Economy. 1(1): 82:103.
Frieden, Jeffry A.. 1991. Debt, Development, and Democracy: Modern Political Economy and Latin America, 1965-1985. Princeton: Princeton University Press. Chapter 1, pp. 15-41.
Hall, Peter A.. 1986. Governing the Economy. Oxford University Press. Chapters 1, 10, 11.
Iversen, Torben and David Soskice. 2002. Political Parties and the Time Inconsistency Problem in Social Welfare Provision. Mimeo.
Iverson, Torben and Wren, Anne (1998) 'Equality, employment and budgetary restraint: The trilemma of the service economy', World Politics, Vol. 50, pp. 507-46.
Iverson, Torben and David Soskice. 2003. Electoral systems and the politics of coalitions: Why some democracies redistribute more than others. Unpublished manuscript.
Katzenstein, Peter. 1985. Small States in World Markets. Industrial Policy in Europe. Ithaca: Cornell University Press. Chapters TBA.
Lars Calmfors and J. Driffill. 1988. "Bargaining Structure, Corporatism and Macroeconomic Performance," Economic Policy, 6, pp. 13-47.
Midford, P.1993.International Trade and Domestic Politics: Improving on Rogowski's Model of Political Alignments. International Organization, Vol. 47, No. 4. (Autumn, 1993), pp. 535-564.
Murillo, Maria Victoria. 2000.“From Populism to Neoliberalism: Labor Unions and Market Reforms in Latin America,” World Politics 52 (January 2000).
Peter Swenson. “Bringing Capital Back In, or Social Democracy Reconsidered: Employer Power, Cross-Class Alliances, and Centralization of Industrial Relations in Denmark and Sweden,” World Politics 1991, pages 513-45.
Przeworski, Adam and Fernando Limongi. 1993. “Political Regimes and Economic Growth,” Journal of Economic Perspectives 7: 51-69.
Robinson, James and Thierry Verdier. 2001. The of Political Economy Clientelism. JEL. Unpublished manuscript.
Rodrik, Dani. 1998. “Why Do Open Economies Have Bigger Governments?” Journal of Political Economy 106: 997-1032.
Schneider and Maxfield. 1997. Business and Politics. Cambridge U.P. Chapters 1, 2, and 3.
Stephen P. Magee. 1980. "Three simple tests of the Stopler-Samuelson theorem." In P. Oppenheimer, ed. Issues in International Economics. Pp. 138-153. London: Oriel.
Thelen, K. and Sven Steinmo. Historical Institutionalism in comparative Perspective. Princeton U.P. Chapter 1.
Wallerstein, Michael. “Wage-Setting Institutions and Pay Inequality in Advanced Industrial Societies,”American Journal of Political Science 43 (July): 649-680.
Weiland, Kurt. The Politics of Market Reform in Fragile Democracies. Princeton U.P. 2002. Chapters 1, 2, 3, 6 and 9.
Weingast, Barry, Kenneth Shepsle, and C. Johnson, "The Political Economy of Costs and Benefits: A Neoclassical Approach to Distributive Politics," JPE 1981: 642-64.
Wendy Carlin and David Soskice. 1990. Macroeconomics and the Wage Bargain. A Modern Approach to Employment, Inflation and the Exchange Rate. Oxford: Oxford University Press.
Schedule
Week 1: Introduction: Institutions, Political Conflict, and the Economy
Selected readings from Weber (Economic Categories of social life), Marx (Introduction to the Grundrisse), Polanyi (The Great Transformation), Schumpeter (Capitalism, socialism and democracy), and Keynes.
Recommended
Douglas North. 1981. Structure and Change in Economic History. New York: Norton. Chapters 1, 6, and conclusion.
Thelen, K. and Sven Steinmo. Historical Institutionalism in comparative Perspective. Princeton U.P. Chapter 1.
Part I: Partisanship, Growth, and Equality
Week 2: Partisanship and Equality
Boix, Carles. 1998. Political Parties, Growth and Equality: Conservative and Social Democratic Strategies in the World Economy. New York: Cambridge University.
Weingast, Barry, Kenneth Shepsle, and C. Johnson, "The Political Economy of Costs and Benefits: A Neoclassical Approach to Distributive Politics," JPE 1981: 642-64.
Week 3: Divided Government and the Economy
Alesina, Alberto and Howard Rosenthal.1995. Political Parties, Divided Government, and the Economy. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.
Epstein, David and Sharyn O’Hallaran. 1996. Divided Government and the Design of Administrative Procedures: A formal Model and Empirical Test. Journal of Politics. 52(2): 373-397.
Alberto Alesina and Jeffrey Sachs. 1988. "Political Parties and the Business Cycle in the United States, 1948-1984," Journal of Money, Credit and Banking, 20, pp. 63-83.
Recommended
Alesina, Alberto and Nouriel Roubini. Political Cycles and the Macroeconomy. MIT Press. ISBN: 0262510944.
Week 4: Partisanship and Redistribution in Open Economies
Garrett, G. 1997. Partisan Politics in the Global Economy. New York: Cambridge University Press.
Alessina, Alberto and Dani Rodrik. 1994. Distributive Politics and Economic Growth. Quarterly Journal of Economics. May.
Week 5: Representative Redistribution?
Przeworski, Adam, Susan C. Stokes and Bernard Manin, eds. 1999. Democracy, Accountability, and Representation. New York: Cambridge University Press.
Alessina, Alberto, Stephan Danninger, and Massimo Rostagno.2001. Redistribution Through Public Employment: The Case of Italy. IMF Staff Papers Vol. 48, No. 3.
Baron, David, "Majoritarian Incentives, Pork Barrel Programs, and Procedural Control," AJPS 35, 1991: 57-90.
Robinson, James and Thierry Verdier. 2001. The of Political Economy Clientelism. JEL. Unpublished manuscript.
Part II: The Distributive Politics of Regime Change
Week 6: Formal Models of Class Conflict I
Boix, Carles. 2003. Democracy and Redistribution. Cambridge. U.P. ISBN: 0521532671.
Przeworski, Adam and Fernando Limongi. 1993. “Political Regimes and Economic Growth,” Journal of Economic Perspectives 7: 51-69.
Recommended
Boix, Carles and Susan Stokes. Endogenous Democratization. Unpublished manuscript.
Boix, Carles. 2001. “Democracy, Development and the Public Sector.” American Journal of Political Science 45 (January).
Week 7: Formal Models of Class Conflict II
Acemoglu, Daron and James Robinson. The Political Origins of Dictatorship and Democracy. Unpublished manuscript.
Recommended
Acemoglu, Johnson and Robinson. 2001. Reversal of Fortune: Geography and Institutions in the Making of the Modern World Income Distribution. Mimeo.
Part III: Welfare Politics
Week 8: The Size of the Public Sector
Cameron, David R.. 1978. "The Expansion of the Public Economy: A Comparative Analysis," AmericanPolitical Science Review, 72, pp. 1243-1261.
Downs, Anthony, "Why the Government's Budget is Too Small in a Democracy," World Politics 12 (1960): 541-63.
Rodrik, Dani. 1998. “Why Do Open Economies Have Bigger Governments?” Journal of Political Economy 106: 997-1032.
Iverson, Torben and David Soskice. 2003. Electoral systems and the politics of coalitions: Why some democracies redistribute more than others. Unpublished manuscript.
Week 9: Welfare Regimes
Esping-Andersen, Gosta. 1990. The Three Worlds of Welfare Capitalism. Cambridge U.P. ISBN: 0691028575.
Iverson, Torben and Wren, Anne (1998) 'Equality, employment and budgetary restraint: The trilemma of the service economy', World Politics, Vol. 50, pp. 507-46.
Peter Swenson. “Bringing Capital Back In, or Social Democracy Reconsidered: Employer Power, Cross-Class Alliances, and Centralization of Industrial Relations in Denmark and Sweden,” World Politics 1991, pages 513-45.
Iversen, Torben and David Soskice. 2002. Political Parties and the Time Inconsistency Problem in Social Welfare Provision. Mimeo.
Week 10: Capital, Labor, and Politics I
Iversen, Torben, Jonas Pontusson, and David Soskice. 1999. Unions, Employers, and Central Banks : Macroeconomic Coordination and Institutional Change in Social Market Economies. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. ISBN: 0521788846.
Lars Calmfors and J. Driffill. 1988. "Bargaining Structure, Corporatism and Macroeconomic Performance," Economic Policy, 6, pp. 13-47.
Wallerstein, Michael. “Wage-Setting Institutions and Pay Inequality in Advanced Industrial Societies,”American Journal of Political Science 43 (July): 649-680.
Recommended
Wendy Carlin and David Soskice. 1990. Macroeconomics and the Wage Bargain. A Modern Approach to Employment, Inflation and the Exchange Rate. Oxford: Oxford University Press.
Week 11: Capital, Labor, and Politics II
Peter Swenson. “Bringing Capital Back In, or Social Democracy Reconsidered: Employer Power, Cross-Class Alliances, and Centralization of Industrial Relations in Denmark and Sweden,” World Politics1991, pages 513-45.
Murillo, Maria Victoria. 2000.“From Populism to Neoliberalism: Labor Unions and Market Reforms in Latin America,” World Politics 52 (January 2000).
Hall, Peter A.. 1986. Governing the Economy. Oxford University Press. Chapters 1, 10, 11.
Schneider, Ben and Silvia Maxfield. 1997. Business and Politics. Cambridge U.P. Chapters 1, 2, and 3.
Part IV: Trade Politics
Week 12: Distributive Politics and Trade
Gourevitch, Peter. 1986. Politics in Hard Times: Comparative Responses to International Economic Crises. Ithaca: Cornell University Press. ISBN: 0801494362.
Frieden, Jeffrey.1994. Exchange Rate Politics: Contemporary Lessons from the American History. Review of International Political Economy. 1(1): 82:103.
Jeffry A. Frieden. 1991. Debt, Development, and Democracy: Modern Political Economy and Latin America, 1965-1985. Princeton: Princeton University Press. Chapter 1, pp. 15-41.
Week 13: Trade and Coalitions
Rogowsky, Ronald. 1990. Commerce and Coalitions. Princeton U.P. ISBN: 0691023301.
Midford, P.1993.International Trade and Domestic Politics: Improving on Rogowski's Model of Political Alignments. International Organization, Vol. 47, No. 4. (Autumn, 1993), pp. 535-564.
Stephen P. Magee. 1980. "Three simple tests of the Stopler-Samuelson theorem." In P. Oppenheimer, ed. Issues in International Economics. Pp. 138-153. London: Oriel.
Week 14: Open Economy-Politics
Bates, Robert H. 1998.Open-Economy Politics: The Political Economy of the World Coffee Trade. Princeton U.P. ISBN: 0691005192.
Katzenstein, Peter. 1985. Small States in World Markets. Industrial Policy in Europe. Ithaca: Cornell University Press. Chapters TBA.